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PROOF OF DAMAGES UNDER THE ANTI-TRUST LAW
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN -2 AND
RALSTONE R. IRVINE t
Since 189o, any person injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden by the Anti-Trust Laws "may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee . . " 1
i-A. B., i9o5, LL.B., 1907, Columbia University; Assistant Attorney General of
the United States, 1924-25; Assistant to Attorney General, 1925-29; counsel to com-
mission for revision of New York State public service commission laws, 1929; author,
The Effect of the Decision in the Sugar Institute Case upon Trade Association Activi-
ties (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 929, and of other articles in legal periodicals.
4: A. B., 1923, LL. B., 1926, Cornell University; Special Assistant to Attorney Gen-
eral, 1927-29; contributor to various legal periodicals.
i. Section 7 of the Sherman Law reads as follows:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other
person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful
by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district
in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 26 STAT. 209 (1890).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act says:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 38 STAT. 731 (I914), 15 U. S. C. A. § i (1927).
Of interest, both to the practitioner and his client, is the provision of the statute
that the person injured shall recover "a reasonable attorney's fee". The amount of "a
reasonable attorney's fee" is for the determination of the trial judge in the exercise of
a sound discretion. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917) ; William H. Rankin Co.
v. Associated Bill Posters (Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Same), 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A.
2d, I93O), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 864 (193o). But an appellate court may award an
additional fee where an appeal has been taken. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning
Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (1930). In de-
termining the amount of attorney's fees to be allowed, many elements must be consid-
ered, and some of these are the character of the services rendered, the manner in which
rendered, the time occupied, and the result attained. Not the least important element
(5n)
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By the express terms of the Anti-Trust Laws recovery is limited
to instances in which plaintiff has been injured "in his business or
property". Consequently, there can be no recovery of damages for
injury to other rights such as general credit and reputation.' But this
does not mean that there may be no recovery for injury to the business
credit and business standing of the plaintiff.
In the usual anti-trust case, the nature of plaintiff's damage makes
it impossible to prove with certainty and exactness the amount of
damage suffered. For example, the plaintiff has lost profits as a result
of defendant's unlawful acts,3 his cost of doing business has increased,
4
his plant has deteriorated in value, 5 or his business is worthless as a
going concern."
In establishing such damage a plaintiff is limited "to the best proof.
obtainable". He must usually rely upon inference, estimate, compari-
son and opinion. While recognizing this inherent difficulty of proof,
the courts have not always permitted recovery. In many of the early
decisions the plaintiff was denied substantial recovery on the theory
is the responsibility which rests upon counsel. It has also been said that a "reasonable
fee" is to be measured by the standards of the locality where the services were per-
formed. This consideration is not based upon mere "geographical distinction in respect
of the ability of attorneys", but upon differences in the cost of conducting a large prac-
tice in various localities. Straus et al. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791,
8o5-8o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). The amounts which have actually been allowed as reason-
able show the widest variation. For example:
Amount of Attorney's
Case Jidgiment Fee
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (1904) ....... $ 1,500.oo $ 750.00
Chattanooga Foundry Co. v. Atlanta, 2o3 U. S. 390 (I9o6) 4,500.00 2,500.00
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (917) .................. 22,719.18 2,5oo.oo
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1924) ..................................... .o,684.13 30,000.00
Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F.
(2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, i93o) ......................... 25,637.09 7,500.0o
William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F.
(2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ...................... 277,329.58 42,5oo.oo
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763
(C. C. A. 7th, 193o) .............................. 9oooo.oo 15,000.00
plus $3,500.00for the appeal
Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
79
F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ................... 2,868,9oo.oo 300,000.00
2. Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F. (2d) 959 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) ; Corey v.
Boston Ice Co., 2o7 Fed. 465 (D. Mass. 1913).
3. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 56o
(1931).
4. Chattanooga Foundry v. City of Atlanta, 2o3 U. S. 390 (19o6).
5. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 567
(1931).
6. Id. Loss of value as a going concern was treated inferentially as an item of
damages. In his charge to the jury the trial judge had said: "I think it must be said
that the property has diminished. It is worth less with the company out of business
than it would be with the company in business." Same case, at 37 F. (2d) 537, 543 (C.
C. A. ist, 193o).
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that the extent of damage was left to speculation and conjecture.7 But
that general conclusion is reached less frequently today. Recent cases
reflect a trend toward permitting recovery in all instances where a
wrong has been definitely established and the only uncertainty relates
to the quantum of damage. It is the purpose of this article to examine
the decisions which have dealt with this problem under the anti-trust
laws.
APPLICABLE COMMON LAW RULES AS TO DAMAGES
There are certain fundamental common law principles relating
to the measure and proof of damage in litigation generally which have
influenced, if they have not controlled, the decisions arising under the
anti-trust laws.
The "most fundamental general rule is that of Certainty. Dam-
ages must be certain, both in their nature and in respect to the cause
from which they spring".8 This conforms to the usual rules of legal
proof. For, aside from any question of damages, it is well settled
that a verdict which is based on speculation or hypothesis will not be
affirmed. 9 It must be based upon proof which is of certain nature.
And to be admissible, evidence normally must be factual in character.10
The same rule is true of damages. The extent and origin of the injury
must be proved with such reasonable certainty as is permitted by the
nature of the case."
But even at common law, where the existence of a loss was estab-
lished, absolute certainty in proving its quantum was not required.
Expediency impelled the courts eventually to concede that "when, from
the nature of the case, the amount of damages cannot be estimated
with certainty . . . we can see no objection to placing before the jury
all the facts and circumstances of the case, having any tendency to show
7. Central Coal and Coke Co. v. Hartman, 1ii Fed. 96, 102 (C. C. A. 8th, i9oi) ;
Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218 Fed. 447, 450 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; American Sea
Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77, 8o (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; and cases cited
note 18 infra.
8. Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, 495 (1858) ; SEDGwIcK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW
OF DAMAGES (2d ed. 1gog) 13. To similar effect see i SEDGWlcIK, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1912) 317-18; I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916) 207.
9. Gulf, Mobile and Northern R. R. v. Wells, 275 U. S. 455, 459 (1928); Penn-
sylvania R. R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333, 343 (933); Scotten v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 724, 81 S. W. (2d) 313 (935). "'Food for speculation will not
serve as the basis of a verdict' ", quoted with approval by Cardozo, C. J., in Von Reitz-
enstein v. Tomlinson, 249 N. Y. 6o, 67, 162 N. E. 584, 586 (1928).
10. SEDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2d ed. 1909) 23; I WIGmORE,
EviDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 148-154.
ii. Boston & Albany R. R. v. O'Reilly, 158 U. S. 334 (1895); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Ivy, 177 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 8th, igio) ; Calkins v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 27 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 645 (1928) ; Little-
hale v. Osgood, I6i Mass. 340, 37 N. E. 375 (1894) ; Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lan-
tern Co., 131 N. Y. 90, 29 N. E. 999 (x892) ; i SEDGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912)
322, 323; SEDGWIcK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2d ed. 19o9) 23; 15 AM.
JUR. (1938) 796.
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damages, or their probable amount; so as to enable them to make the
most intelligible and probable estimate which the nature of the case
will permit." 12 The common law cases most frequently cited as prec-
edents in the anti-trust field are those dealing with tortious inter-
ference with business. Perhaps the most common type of damage
suffered in such instances is loss of profits. Most of the early cases
refused to permit recovery for this item of damage.13 But it is now
established at common law that recovery may be had for such loss of
profits as is proved with reasonable certainty.14  "The allowance of
profits . . . is wholly a question of certainty." 1' At common law
there might also be recovery for the additional expense in conducting
a business made necessary by the wrongful act of another. 6 And it is
clear that one whose property is injured or destroyed is entitled to
compensation therefor.'
7
With these general principles in mind, we turn to the anti-trust
cases.
THE REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY UNDER THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
The Federal courts have repeatedly indicated in their anti-trust
opinions that there must be proof certain as to the nature and extent
of plaintiff's damage.' 8 These pronouncements have been vigorously
applied wherever the question of proximate cause has arisen. 19 All of
12. Christiancy, J., in Allison v. Chandler, ii Mich. 542, 555 (1863), quoted with
approval by the Court in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282
U. S. 555, 564 (193I). See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. S. 359,
379 (I927) ; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 129 (1871) ; Taylor v. Bradley, 4 Abb.
App. Dec. 363, 366, 367 (N. Y. i868) ; i SEDGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 321-322.
13. I SmGwIcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 332; 15 AM. Jur. (1938) 557 and cases
cited n. ig.
L4. I SDGwlcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 334-36. "If a regular and established
business is wrongfully interruped the damages thereto can be shown by proving the
usual profits for a reasonable time anterior to the wrong complained of." I SUTHER-
LAND, LAW OF DAMAGES (4 th ed. 1916) 266 and cases cited n. 65.
I5. I S-xDwicc, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) 332.
r6. I5 Am. JuR. (1938) 542 and cases cited n. 16.
17. Id. at 513 et seq.
18. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917) ; Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry., 260 U. S.
156 (1922); Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218 Fed. 447 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914);
American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; East-
man Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Baush Mach. Tool
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Lowry v. Tile
Ass'n, io6 Fed. 38 (N. D. Cal. igoo) ; Ebeling v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 12 F. Supp. 489
(W. D. Wash. 1935).
ig. Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry., 26o U. S. 156 (1922); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931) ; Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 3d, igio); United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.,
232 Fed. 574 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 Fed. 741 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923); Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., I5 F. (2d) 678 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1926), cert. denied, 278 U. S. 757 (1927); Peterson v. Borden Co., 5o F.
(2d) 644 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) ; Peto v. Howell, ioi F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ;
Quittner v. Motion Picture Producers, 5o F. (2d) 266 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) ; Seaboard
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the decisions insist that there can be no recovery under the anti-trust
laws unless the plaintiff definitely establishes that the wrongful act of
the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury. In fact, this
requirement is inherent in the wording of Section 7 of the Sherman
Law and Section 4 of the Clayton Act.20 And not only must the illegal
acts have caused the damage, but it has been indicated they must have
caused it with reasonable directness.
2 1
The cases also disclose that the courts have not been equally insist-
ent that the plaintiff introduce definite and certain proof of the amount
of his damage. "The constant tendency of the courts is to find some
way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done.
Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of re-
covery".
22
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.23 is the
leading case. There the plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting
from a conspiracy to monopolize trade in vegetable parchment. The
Supreme Court held that two items of damage had properly been sub-
mitted to the jury.
The first of these was the difference, if any, between the amounts
actually realized by the plaintiff and what would have been realized
from sales at reasonable prices except for defendant's unlawful acts.
With respect to this damage, the proof showed the prices received by
the plaintiff before the injury complained of and those received there-
after. Upon this proof the trial court had instructed the jury that if
they were satisfied that the old prices were reasonable and would not
have been changed by reason of any economic condition, they might
consider as an element of damage ". . . the difference between the
prices actually received and what would have been received but for
the unlawful conspiracy." 24
Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 3 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv. ff25013 (S. D. N. Y.
1936) ; cf. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 536 (191S) ; United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Co., 258 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 'gig), rev'd on other grounds, 259 U. S. 344
(1938).
2o. See note i mtpra.
21. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704 (C. C. A. 3d, igio) ; Seaboard Ter-
minals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 3 C. C. H. Tr. Reg. Serv. 25013.
22. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791, 802 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359 (1927);
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (93) ; Penn-
sylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 166 Fed. 254 (C. C. A.
2d, 1908); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 24o Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 4th,
1917), cert. denied, 251 U. S. 551 (ig9g) ; William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill
Posters (Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Same), 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o), cert.
denied, 282 U. S. 864 (930); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d)
763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (931) ; Hansen Packing Co. v.
Swift & Co., 27 F. Supp. 364 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
23. 282 U. S. 555 (93).
24. Id. at 562.
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The second item of damage allowed was the extent to which the
property of the plaintiff had depreciated in value as a result of the de-
fendant's acts. The plaintiff introduced evidence, through its treasurer,
that its plant had cost $235,000 of which $9o,ooo had been used to
purchase and install a parchmentizing machine. As a result of defend-
ant's unlawful activities, the plant closed and was never thereafter op-
erated for the purpose for which it was built. The treasurer of the
company estimated the market value of the plant after it had been
closed down at $75,000.2 5  Defendant's contention that the amount of
such damages was based upon speculation and conjecture was rejected.
The court stated that "there is a clear distinction between the measure
of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained
some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury
to fix the amount." 20 It was asserted that the rule which precludes
the recovery of uncertain damages applies to damages which are not the
certain result of the wrong, but not to those which are definitely attrib-
utable to the wrong and uncertain only as to amount. The general
limitations of the requirement of definite and certain proof were out-
lined as follows:
"Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the
ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would
be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer
from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the
damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it
will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as
a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be
only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain
that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision
that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible
for making, were otherwise." 27
Subject to this modest requirement as to certainty, the courts have
generally permitted recovery under the anti-trust laws for various
25. Cases dealing with recovery for depreciation in value of business or property
are: Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931) ;
Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 166 Fed. 254 (C. C.
A. 2d, i9o8) ; Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 8Io (C. C. A. 3d, I92) ;
Cilley v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 202 Fed. 598 (D. Mass. 1913). See also United
Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574 (C. C. A. 2d, I916),
and Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935). In the Bausd case the proof of damage was held to be insufficient.
26. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 562
(1931).
27. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 563
(I931). But the plaintiff must submit the best proof available. Otherwise it may be
suspected that he has really suffered no injury, and recovery will be denied. Central
Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, IXI Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, igoi) ; American Sea Green
Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915). See also Note (930) 39
YALE L. J. 1035, io37-38.
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types of damage. In addition to the two items of damage considered
in the Story Parchment Company case the decisions have involved
chiefly damage resulting from increased cost of doing business and
loss of profits.
The cases dealing with the first of these items can be briefly dis-
posed of. It is well settled by the Federal anti-trust decisions that one
whose cost of doing business is increased by virtue of the defendants'
acts in violation of the Sherman or Clayton Act is entitled to recover
damages. For example, where a party is required to pay more for an
article as a result of a restraint of trade, damages consisting of the
difference between the price paid and the market price under competi-
tive conditions may be recovered. 28  These cases would seem to be in
line with the common law authorities, which have been considered,
holding that one whose cost of doing business has been increased as
the result of the tortious act of another may recover damages for such
increase.
2 9
RECOVERY FOR Loss OF PROFITS3 0
The most difficult problems involve claims for loss of profits.
Recovery of such losses, however, is common under the anti-trust laws.
It was permitted even in the more recent cases at common law although
there was a somewhat strict adherence to the rule of certainty. The
anti-trust authorities, on the other hand, are quite liberal in permitting
recovery. The trend of the decisions becomes apparent from a brief
consideration of the leading cases.
28. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (19o6); Thom-
sen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917) ; Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed.
791 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Peto v. Howell, ioi F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) ;
United States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 Fed. 70, (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
19o8); Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco Co., 165 Fed. 774 (C. C. W. D.
Ky. i9o8). In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, supra, the city
sought damages because it had been led to purchase pipe at a price much above what it
was worth. The purchase was made after a pretended competition at a price fixed by
the combination. Plaintiff obtained a verdict for the difference between the price paid
and the estimated competitive price in the absence of the combination. The verdict and
the resulting judgment were upheld by the Supreme Court which said that the city
was injured in its property . . . by being led to pay more than the worth of
the pipe". Id. at 396.
29. 15 AM. JuR. (1938) 542.
30. Some cases discussing recovery for loss of profits are: Thomsen v. Cayser, 243
U. S. 66 (917); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359
(1927) ; Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931) ;
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, iii Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, igoi); Wheeler-
Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907) ;
American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Frey
& Son, Inc. v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 24o Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917), cert. denied,
251 U. S. 551 (199); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 8io (C. C. A.
3d, 192i) ; Willian H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (Charles A. Ramsay Co.
v. Same), 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 864 (930);
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U. S. 899 (193o) ; Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79
F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), rev'g, 72 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U. S. 589 (1934).
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The first case to reach the Supreme Court involving loss of profits
by reason of a violation of the Anti-Trust Laws was Thomsen v.
Cayser.31 It clearly appeared in that case, however, that the profits
were not left to the speculation of the jury.3 2  In establishing the
amount of lost profits "There were different sums stated, resulting
from the loss of particular customers, and the fact of their certainty
was submitted to the jury." 33 This, then, was a case where the amount
of lost profits was established with as much certainty and exactness
as is possible in any claim to recover for such an injury. Yet, in affirm-
ing the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court was careful
to point out that the members of the jury ". . . were told that they
'ought not to allow any speculative damages,' that they were not
'required to guess' as to what damages 'plaintiffs claim to have sus-
tained.' And, further, that the burden of proof was upon plaintiffs
and that from the evidence the jury should be able to make a calcula-
tion of what the damages were. Besides, plaintiffs alleged an over-
clurge, and the verdict of the jury was for its amount and interest." 84
A plaintiff will derive little comfort from this case. It is not
always possible to trace loss of profits to particular purchasers whose
custom has been diverted by the combination. A victim of a combina-
tion may retain all of his customers, yet suffer a serious diminution of
profits due to the conspiracy. That was the situation presented to the
Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co.8 5 There the plaintiff attempted to recover profits allegedly lost
over a period of four years. "The plaintiff's claim was that under these
circumstances it was entitled to recover, as the loss of profits which
it would have realized had it been able to continue the purchase of de-
fendant's goods, the amount of its gross profits on the defendant's
goods during the four years preceding the period in suit, which was
shown, less the additional expense which it would have incurred in
handling the defendant's goods during the four years' period in suit,
which was estimated." 86 The Supreme Court rejected the claim that
plaintiff's damages were purely speculative, and held that the proof
submitted afforded a proper basis from which to calculate loss of
31. 243 U. S. 66 (1917).
32. "The plaintiffs alleged a charge over a reasonable rate and the amount of it.
If the charge be true that more than a reasonable rate was secured by the combination,
the excess over what was reasonable was an element of injury. . . . The unreason-
ableness of the rate and to what extent unreasonable was submitted to the jury and the
verdict represented their conclusion." Id. at 88.
33. Id. at 89.
34. Ibid. (Italics supplied.)
35. 273 U. S. 359 (1927).
36. Id. at 376.
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profits.3 7 It quoted with approval the observation of the Court of Ap-
peals that "It is sufficient if a reasonable basis of computation is
afforded, although the result be only approximate." 88 Then followed
its own conclusion that ". . . a defendant whose wrongful conduct
has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages suffered
by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured
with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be pos-
sible." 19
The trend indicated in these cases reached its ultimate conclusion
in William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (Charles A. Ram-
say Co. v. Same) .40 There, two separate actions were tried together
by consent of the parties. In the first action, the plaintiff Rankin Co.
put its treasurer on the stand. Over objection and exception he showed
the net profits of the business in 1911, and then stated what he con-
sidered would have been the normal increase in the plaintiff's business
from year to year. On this basis he was permitted to estimate the
company's probable yearly net earnings from July 1913 to June 1918,
and to explain how such estimates were reached. In the second case,
the plaintiff Ramsay Co. did not introduce any estimate of probable
future earnings. It was content to leave the matter on proof of past
earnings, expenses and net profits. In each case the plaintiff obtained
37- Even more striking is the case of American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44
F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (1930). The plaintiff in
that case was engaged in canning and selling foodstuffs. Its chief competitor was the
Van Camp Packing Company. The proof established that beginning in 1921 the defend-
dant Can Company, in violation of section 2 of the CLAYTO Acr, 38 STAT. 730 (1914),
I5 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927) sold cans to the Van Camp Packing Company at lower
prices than it sold them to the plaintiff. The evidence relied upon by the Court in affirm-
ing the judgment for the plaintiff is thus summarized in its opinion at p. 769:
"The instant case well illustrates the difficulty of fairly fixing damages or in
stating a rule for the intelligent guidance of the jury in deliberating on this ques-
tion. Plaintiff's business for five or six years was conducted at a loss, after it had
been for years previously conducted profitably. Its officers attribute such loss to
price cutting by Van Camp made possible by defendant's discriminations in the
sale of cans to Van Camp. The business involved large turnovers on a small per-
centage of profit. When plaintiff showed a loss of customers due to Van Camp's
underselling it, and supplemented this proof with evidence that Van Camp's under-
selling was made possible by the discrimination made by defendant in the sale of
its tin cans, it was (proof as to other issues appearing) entitled to recover at least
nominal damages.
"But this was not all the proof. The usual profit under normal operations on
a case of canned goods is shown by the testimony of numerous witnesses. The
profit which various canners were able to make prior to the price cutting of Van
Camp also appears. The effect of the Van Camp price cutting on plaintiff's busi-
ness is clearly inferable. The jury's award is lower than any theory of plaintiff's
witnesses.
"The case is one for the application of the rule which denies defendant's right
to take refuge behind the alleged uncertainty of indefiniteness of the plaintiff's
proof of damages which were occasioned by defendant's own wrongdoing and its
concealment of such fact from the injured party."
38. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 35g, 379
(1927).
39. Ibid.
40. 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 864 (193o).
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a judgment for damages resulting from plaintiff's exclusion from the
business of soliciting billboard advertising.
The appeal presented the anomalous situation where in one case
the defendants took ". . . the position in respect to one plaintiff that
it was error to introduce evidence of estimated future earnings because
it is too speculative, and the position in respect to the other plaintiff
that it was fatal to a recovery not to do so." 41
The Court affirmed the judgment in each action, specifically holding
that the evidence as to damage was, in view of all the facts and circum-
stances, sufficiently definite and certain. In the case of the Ramsay
Co., it observed:
"Had there been no evidence from which damages could be
fixed by the jury, of course this plaintiff could not recover. But
there was evidence. The financial history of the Ramsay business
was in the case. Perhaps the jury was not as competent to analyze
that evidence as some financial and business expert might have
been, but it could draw its own reasonable conclusions from it.
That is what a jury is to do anyway in arriving at the amount
of damages in any case. The jury had the data before it, and was
left to determine the damages from that in what may be called its
raw state. Perhaps the testimony of some one competent to have
estimated the business loss resulting from the defendants' acts
would have helped, but it was not indispensable." 42
Thus, the requirement of certainty, if it ever existed in fact, was virtu-
ally abandoned in this case. A mass of technical data in the "raw
state" was literally dumped into the lap of the jury. From that mate-
rial the jury was required to estimate the amount of future profits
without the aid of expert advice or opinion. But a plaintiff who failed
to introduce "some one competent to have estimated" probable earnings
would be running an unnecessary risk. The requirement that a plain-
tiff must submit the best proof obtainable might lead some other court
to insist upon such proof.
The doctrine of the Ramsay case finds some support in Frey &
Son, Inc. v. Welch Grape Juice Co.
43
In that case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
found that there was evidence to show that the defendant had an un-
derstanding with the jobbers and wholesalers to whom it sold Welch's
grape juice that they should sell to retailers at not less than a fixed
price. Plaintiff, a wholesale grocer with a considerable trade in defend-
ant's goods, sold at a lower price than that required by defendant.
41. Id. at 156.
42. Ibid.
43. 240 Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917), cert. denied, 251 U. S. 55, (19,9).
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Thereupon, defendant refused to sell to plaintiff except at its required
price. As a result, plaintiff lost (i) the profits which it would have
made in the regular course of its sales of Welch's grape juice and (2)
a certain amount of trade in other commodities, since customers who
desired Welch's grape juice transferred their general accounts to other
jobbers. The trial court limited the measure of damages to (i) the
profit plaintiff would have made on two particular orders proved to
have been given to plaintiff and which it was unable to fill, and (2)
the profit plaintiff would have made but for the alleged discrimination
on 200 cases which it bought from another dealer at a higher price than
that charged to other wholesalers by defendant.
The Circuit Court of Appeals found this to be error and i'eversed
the case. It held that the damages recoverable were those arising from
the unlawful interruption of plaintiff's business in selling Welch's
grape juice. This damage could not as a matter of law be limited to
the loss of profit on specific sales. Ordinarily, it is impossible for a
merchant whose business is broken up to prove all the specific sales he
has lost. But ". . . the plaintiff testified that in the year 1911, before
the alleged discrimination began, it sold 19o cases of Welch's grape
juice, and it also proved the average increase of its general business for
the succeeding years. This average increase of general business was
evidence from which the jury could have inferred the probable increase
of the sale of this brand of grape juice, had the plaintiff been able to
purchase it on the same terms as other jobbers. This evidence, together
with that offered by the plaintiff of the per cent. of profit made by it on
sales of the grape juice, should have been submitted to the jury as data
from which in connection with any other relevant facts they could
arrive at the damage which the alleged combination and discrimination
caused the plaintiff." " The court paid formal homage to the rule of
certainty by stating that it would not permit the jury merely to guess
at damages and by holding that the damages arising from the inci-
dental loss of general business in other commodities were too remote
and uncertain.
From the cases that have been considered, it appears that recovery
for lost profits may be had in spite of inherent uncertainties of proof.45
But recovery has not been permitted in every anti-trust case. The plain-
tiff must offer at least the best proof available.
Thus, in Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman,46 plaintiff claimed
damages for loss of some of the expected profits of the business of buy-
44. Id. at IX7.45. A fortiori, recovery will be permitted in the case of specific proof. See Thorn-
sen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 89 (917), where sums resulting from the loss of specified
customers were proved.
46. iIX Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, Igoi).
5=2 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ing and selling coal between certain dates. It appeared that both the
plaintiff and the defendant had previously belonged to an organization
that had allegedly controlled the price of coal in violation of the Sher-
man Law. The plaintiff withdrew from the organization. Thereupon
the defendants refused to sell any goal to plaintiff except at retail
prices. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for the
plaintiff on the ground that the damages had been established by specu-
lation, guessing and estimates of witnesses. The court said that as a
general rule the expected profits of a business are too speculative to
permit recovery.
"He who is prevented from embarking in a new business
can recover no profits, because there are no provable data of past
business from which the fact that anticipated profits would have
been realized can be legally deduced. . . . And one who seeks
to recover for the loss of the anticipated profits of an established
business without proof of the expenses and income of the business
for a reasonable length of time before as well as during the inter-
ruption is in no better situation." 47
On its facts the case is distinguishable from those previously consid-
ered. The plaintiff had previously participated in the alleged con-
spiracy. His only record of past earnings was during the time when he
had belonged to the combination. Obviously net profits during such
a period afforded no reasonable base from which to compute subsequent
loss of profits. This situation probably led the court to believe that
there had been no real damage.
48
But what of the statement that "He who is prevented from embark-
ing in a new business can recover no profits, because there are no prov-
able data of past business from which the fact that anticipated profits
would have been realized can be legally deduced." This doctrine was
applied in Baush. Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America 49
by the same court which had previously permitted recovery in the
Rankin and Ramsay cases. In the Baush case it appeared that although
the plaintiff had been in business for some years, he had never realized
a profit from the business. The trial court had nevertheless permitted
the plaintiff to show by a witness his estimate of the loss of profits dur-
47. Id. at 99.
48. The same may be said to be true of a decision in American Sea Green Slate
Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915), wherein a decision of the trial court
for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that the damages for loss of profits were
based upon pure speculation. In this case there was no evidence to support the con-
tention that the concerns whose business plaintiff claimed to have lost would have
bought as much of the commodity in question during the period for which plaintiff
claimed damages as they had in earlier years. See also Baush Mach. Tool Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 293 U. S.
589 (1934).
49. 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 589 (1934).
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ing the period for which recovery was permitted. The Appellate Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that "As there
had never been any profits and no reasonable prospects that any would
be made . . his estimate was nothing but a guess based on conditions
contrary to fact. It was too speculative to be admissible." 1o The
court distinguished its decision in the Rankin case by stating that
".. . there was a proper basis for estimate in that case afforded by a
period of profitable operation prior to the defendants' unlawful inter-
ference which prevented a continuance of the former success." 51
In spite of such decisions, the trend is toward awarding damages
to every plaintiff who has suffered a legal wrong under the Anti-Trust
Law. In Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refin-
ing Co.,52 we find the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
suggesting that even a plaintiff who has not previously engaged in busi-
ness may be entitled to some recovery:
"The defendants next contend that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action, because it appears that the plaintiff was not en-
gaged in business at the time of the conspiracy; that it had no
established business to injure. But in the very recent case of
Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail Steamship Co. (decided October,
19o8) 166 Fed. 251, this court said: 'It is" as unlawful to prevent
a person from engaging in business as it is to drive a person out
of business.' A person has a legal right to engage in a lawful busi-
ness. If he is unlawfully excluded from exercising this right,
when he is prepared and intends to exercise it, he suffers an injury
for which the law awards damages-he is 'injured' withirn the
meaning of the federal statute. He may be unable to prove sub-
stantial compensatory damages, but in stating the infringement
of his legal rights he states a cause of action at least for nominal
damages, and may, perhaps, so state it as to call for exemplary
damages.
". .. It is averred that the plaintiff had been engaged in in-
terstate commerce, had temporarily ceased to do business, had built
a new refinery at great expense, and was prepared and intended to
resume business as before. Something more than a mere mental
intention to engage in interstate commerce is involved when a cor-
poration spends millions of dollars in building a sugar refinery
which is only of use when operated and which can only be op-
erated by engaging in interstate commerce. The amount of money
actually lost in the enterprise cannot be regarded as wholly specu-
lative and problematical." 53
50. Id. at 227.
Si. Ibid.
52. 166 Fed. 254 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o8).
53. Id. at 26o. The same approach is apparent in the Story Parchment Company
case, where the Supreme Court, in sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, ignored the
statement of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit [37 F. (2d) 537, 540
(C. C. A. ist, 193o)], that "Obviously in the case at bar there could be no evidence on
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It thus becomes increasingly clear that the courts will some day
award substantial damages for loss of profits to a company which has
never previously engaged in business.
CONCLUSION
From the decisions we have discussed, the following conclusions
seem warranted:
I. Threefold damages may be recovered in private suits under the
Sherman Law and the Clayton Act by persons who have been injured
in their busiiness or property. There may be no recovery for injury to
other rights.
2. The usual common law standards are to be applied in establish-
ing the fact and extent of the injury.
3. As at common law, there can be no recovery unless it be defi-
nitely established that the wrongful acts of the defendants were the
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage.
4. The chief of the common law requirements as to damages-
that of certainty-is applied somewhat more liberally in favor of the
plaintiff in the federal anti-trust cases than is usual at common law.
5. While "the constant tendency of the courts is to find some way
in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done" most
of the anti-trust decisions insist that the plaintiff produce the best proof
available.
6. The principal items of damage which have been allowed under
the anti-trust laws are loss of profits, increased cost of doing bfisiness
and depreciation in the value of property or business.
7. A plaintiff who has never previously engaged in business or
who has never previously operated his business at a profit, may not
recover compensatory damages for loss of prospective profits. The
courts have also indicated, however, that such a plaintiff is clearly
entitled to nominal damages and under certain circumstances may be
awarded exemplary damages.
In providing for treble damages under the anti-trust laws, Con-
gress had clearly in mind the extreme difficulty of maintaining a private
suit under those laws. The experience over the past 70 years suggests
that Congress underestimated the enormity of the task assumed by a
plaintiff seeking threefold damages. Even a cursory examination of
the cases will show that most combinations have been cleverly concealed
which to base an estimate of any actual loss of profits during the period the plaintiff
operated, based on previous experience, since plaintiff never operated under what it
claims are fair and reasonable prices for a sufficient length 6f time to furnish a standard
as the plaintiff had in Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. S. 359, 378 . . .
and the jury were so instructed."
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behind an exterior of plausible legality. The initial problem merely of
proving their existence is one which few persons can afford to under-
take. If the existence of the combination is shown, the complicated
factual and economic problems presented are equally disturbing to a
private litigant. In establishing the nature of the combination and the
cause of his injury, the Court holds the plaintiff to a high degree of
definite proof. It is therefore not surprising that in spite of the liberal
trend of the decisions dealing. with proof of damage the number of
recoveries has been small.
There have been approximately one hundred seventy-five re-
ported decisions involving separate suits for damages under the anti-
trust laws. They embrace nearly ninety different branches of com-
merce.54  It is significant that in only thirteen of these cases was final
recovery had by the plaintiff.5 5  The disposition of suits in which no
written opinion was handed down shows a similar small percentage
of judgments for the plaintiff. 56 For example, in the two-year period
54- Advertising, Aluminum, Automobile, Banana, Banking, Basket Manufacturing,
Book Publishing, Building and Construction, Cameras, Candy, Canning, Carbonic Gas,
Cast Iron Pipe Fittings, Cereal, Cheese, Chinaware and Kitchen Equipment, Cleaning
and Dyeing, Cleaning Powder, Coal, Common Carriers, Copper Mining, Corn Ex-
changes, Creamery Equipment, Disinfectants, Electrical, Electrical Supplies, Excelsior
and Tow, Exhibition Baseball, Fish, Flour, Freight Transfer, Gas and Electric, Gaso-
line, Glass, Grape Juice, Hat Manufacturing, Hosiery, Ice, Iron Pipe, Leather, Liquor,
Lumber, Meat Packing, Merchandise Brokerage & Commission, Milk, Motion Picture,
Nails, Newspaper Publishing, Office Equipment, Oil, Oxyacetylene Apparatus, Paper
Manufacture, Phonograph, Photographic Supplies, Potatoes, Power Manufacturing,
Pullman Cars, Quick Silver Mining, Radio, Railroad, Radio Loud Speakers, Red Cedar
Shingles, Retail Drug, Retail Grocery, Roofing Materials, School Furniture, Shipping,
Shoe Machinery, Silk, Stove, Street Lighting Equipment, Sugar, Telegraph, Telephone,
Tile and Grate, Tin Can, Tires, Tire Chains, Tobacco, Truck Gardening, Trucking,
Vaudeville, Warehouse Storage, Watches, Wholesale Grocery, Wooden Doors.
55. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (I9o4); Chattanooga Foundry and
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (i9o6) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522
(915); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359 (1927); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parch-
ment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed.
793 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) ; William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters (Charles
A. Ramsay Co. v. Same), 42 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o); American Can Co. v.
Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o) ; Albert Pick-Barth Co., Inc.
v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. Ist, 1932); Dextone Co. v.
Building Trades Council, 6o F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Connecticut Importing
Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., ioi F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 2d, i939) ; Victor Talking
Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 8Io (C. C. A. 3d, i921).
56. The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the fiscal
year 1935 shows that during that year there were seventeen private civil suits pending
in the District Courts under the anti-trust laws. Three of these were disposed of by
judgment on jury verdict; one was disposed of on directed jury verdict; one was dis-
posed of by trial without a jury; two were disposed of on the pleadings; one was dis-
posed of on stipulation, consent, confession or compromise; seven were disposed of by
dismissal, discontinuance, withdrawal or non-suit, and two were remanded to the State
Court. (Table 2H, p. 200.)
The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the fiscal
year ended June 3o, 1937, shows that during that year there were forty-two private
civil suits pending in the District Courts under the anti-trust laws. Two of these were
disposed of on the pleadings; three were disposed of by stipulation, consent, confession
or compromise; thirty-five were disposed of by dismissal, discontinuance, withdrawal or
non-suit, and one was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Table 2H, p. I88-189.)
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beginning June 29, 1936 there were 83 private suits pending in the Dis-
trict Courts under the anti-trust laws. Only one of these suits was dis-
posed of by jury verdict. Those familiar with the subject realize, how-
ever, that many claims are settled before any suit is instituted or in any
event before trial. It may therefore be significant to find that during the
same period of time seventy-six such suits were disposed of on stipula-
tion, consent, confession, compromise, dismissal, dicontinuance, with-
drawal or non-suit. In the face of such a record a plaintiff must wel-
come the more recent cases we have discussed.
The Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the fiscal year
ended June 3o, 1938, shows that during that year there were forty-one private civil
suits pending under the anti-trust laws. One of them was disposed of by judgment on
jury verdict; one was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; two were disposed of by stipu-
lation, consent, confession or compromise; thirty-six were dismissed, discontinued, with-
drawn, or non-suited; and one was otherwise disposed of. (Table 2H, p. 233.)
